These decisions show the significance of recent constitutional amendments. They also show that it is not within the power of a state to prohibit citizens of color from participating as jurors in the administration of justice because of their race. Although federal law prohibits racial discrimination in college admissions, historically black colleges and universities continue to teach student bodies that are 75% to 90% African-American. [28] In 1975, Jake Ayers Sr. filed a lawsuit against Mississippi, claiming that they were providing more financial support to predominantly white public colleges. The state settled the lawsuit in 2002 by funneling $503 million to three historically black colleges over 17 years. [29] Much closer, almost directly to the point, is the case of Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v.
State, 133 U.S. 587, 10 Sup. 348, in which the railroad was accused of violating a Mississippi law that required all passenger railroads to provide equal but separate accommodations for white and colored races by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train or by dividing passenger cars by a bulkhead, to obtain separate accommodation. The case was presented from a different perspective than the present case, since it was an indictment against the railway company for failing to provide the separate accommodations, but the issue under consideration was the constitutionality of the legislation. In this case, the Mississippi Supreme Court (66 Miss. 662, 6 South. 203) held that the Act applied only to intra-State trade and, since it concerned the interpretation of the status of the State by its highest court, this was accepted as conclusive. “If it is a question,” the court stated (page 591, 133 U.S. and page 348, 10 Sup.
Ct.), “to fully respect intra-state commerce and not interfere with interstate commerce, then there is obviously no violation of the trade clause of the Federal Constitution. According to this article, there is no doubt about the power of the state to separate interstate passengers into different compartments or to interfere in any way with the privileges and rights of these passengers. All we can verify is whether the state has the power to require that railways within its borders have separate dwellings for the two races. The fact that only intrastate trade is affected is not an interference with the power conferred on Congress by the trade clause. Thus, with respect to a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, the case boils down to the question of whether the Louisiana Statute is reasonable regulation, and there must necessarily be considerable discretion on the part of the legislature in this regard. In deciding on the question of reasonableness, he shall be free to act with reference to the established customs, customs and traditions of the people and with a view to promoting their comfort and maintaining public peace and order. By this standard, we cannot say that a bill authorizing or even requiring the separation of the two races on public transportation is unreasonable or more repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment than congressional bills mandating separate schools for children of color in the District of Columbia whose constitutionality does not appear to have been challenged. or the corresponding laws of state legislators. Chief Justice Warren wrote in his first decision on the U.S. Supreme Court: “Segregation in public education is a denial of the equal protection of the law.
Separating some children of other ages and similar qualifications solely on the basis of their race creates a sense of inferiority with regards to their status in the community that can affect their hearts and minds in ways that are unlikely to ever be undone. In the late 1800s, many states of the former Confederacy passed laws, collectively known as Jim Crow laws, that imposed the separation of whites and African Americans. The Florida Constitution of 1885 and the Constitution of West Virginia prescribed separate education systems. In Texas, laws required separate water fountains, restrooms, and waiting rooms at train stations. [14] In Georgia, restaurants and taverns could not serve white, “colored” guests in the same room; Separate parks were needed for each “race,” as were separate cemeteries. [15] These are just examples from various similar statutes. The first article of the Act provides that “all railway undertakings carrying passengers in their carriages in this State shall provide equal but separate accommodation for the white and coloured races by providing two or more passenger carriages for each passenger train or by dividing the passenger carriages by a partition to provide separate accommodation: provided that this section is not interpreted as such: that it applies to trams. Persons or persons may not, by reason of the race to which they belong, occupy seats on coaches other than those assigned to them. It is one thing for railway undertakings to provide or be legally obliged to provide accommodation equal to all those they are legally obliged to transport.
