During its first decade, CLS developed a distinctive model of such criticisms, which, taught and adapted by followers and students, has been reproduced in about 100 articles covering a variety of areas of law. Criticism of the model has identified deep tensions, polarities or contradictions that underlie an area of legal policy or legal argument. In a groundbreaking article, Kennedy argued that contract law doctrines tended to be grouped around opposing notions of human nature, social obligation, and the functions of law: one preferred formal rules and “individualistic” views on economic transactions and social duties, the other favored informal norms and an “altruistic” ethic of sharing and cooperation (Kennedy 1976). The law in force at a given moment oscillates between the opposite poles when it moves from one subject to another, but tends to privilege one pole and suppress the other by reserving it for extraordinary or marginal situations. Since the 1980s, the anthropology of law has become increasingly interested in the relationship between law and the exercise of power (cf. Starr and Collier 1989). Inspired by Marxist and Foucauldian theory and the movement of critical legal studies in law schools, which held that law reflected the interests of dominant groups and not just the logic of legal reasoning, anthropologists examined how law supports power relations in a variety of social contexts (see Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994). But this research has also shown how the law challenges dominant groups. He showed that the law is a double-edged sword that expresses the rules and sanctioning power of established political authorities while providing opportunities and justifications for resisting political authorities. For example, social movements that claim civil rights, such as the American civil rights movement against racial discrimination in the 1950s and 1960s, are challenging existing hierarchies of power. This CLS component has often been misunderstood. Critics argued that structuring areas of law around such “contradictions” meant that the law was “indefinite” because it could allow judges, lawyers, or reformers (and this was often the case historically) to present valid arguments (according to internal criteria of the legal system) for opposing positions. Doctrinal or political arguments could always be “reversed” by invoking principles at the opposite pole.
This did not mean that the law was a meaningless façade, deception or arbitrary disorder, or that doctrine was merely a mask for crude political decisions; On the contrary, its imprecision was modeled and systemic, an effect of the contradictory structures of law (or liberalism). Nor did it mean that the law was unpredictable, as arguments drawn by one pole or another tended to be stable in the medium term. After all, it was not an indictment of a legal system to say it was “indefinite.” It was simply a fact that was obscured by means of mediation, giving the appearance of a natural law, necessary and almost as good as it could be. In the true sense, legal reasoning refers to a belief in objectivity in seeking answers to legal questions, which judges can make decisions through the application of principles. For example, in civil law or continental systems, analog thinking is used as a tool to fill a gap in legislation or code. In the civil or continental legal system, the basic concept of analogous reasoning derives from the fact that codes are issued to provide guidance on all legal issues covered by the Code. While scientific reasoning is about discovering the truth, legal reasoning deals with normative statements that are essentially based on a value judgment of the legislator or a judge that a certain consequence should or should follow a certain behavior. The main message of Levi`s treatment of legal reasoning is that determining analogies is a crucial part of such an argument. The two central forms of legal argumentation are the arguments of precedent and analogy. These are found in many jurisdictions such as the common law, which can be found in England and the United States. There are fundamental elements that emerge in reasoning that need to be addressed: he notes that argumentation, the ultimate method of legal reasoning, necessarily uses reasons that are tested by its effect to convince those to whom it appeals.
Consistency was explained by MacCormick with respect to the unity of principles in a legal system, arguing that the coherence of a set of legal norms consists in the fact that they are interconnected either by the realization of a common value or common values, or by the fulfillment of one or more common principles. Temporal concepts can be found in important areas of law such as labour law (e.g. time conditions for calculating performance deadlines), commercial law (e.g.dem the time of information used to determine the validity of contracts or to calculate damages† [Blumsohn, 1991]), criminal law (e.g. temporal information on the various elements involved in the analysis of criminal proceedings) and patent law (e.g. those contained in the Regulations for the patent application). In addition, many of the procedural rules associated with these statutes generally require scheduling on the basis of a temporal presentation. However, the doctrines of the suppressed pole are still available as a “dangerous complement” that can and sometimes takes over the privileged position at any time (Kelman 1987). A Pioneer (Unger 1975) generalized criticism in all areas of the right to “liberalism” as a whole; but most practiced it as a form of local criticism, the content of which varied with the criticized field of law. The model also spawned its own kind of structuralist legal history and showed how areas of law are structured around contradictory organizational principles and social visions. For example, teachings reflect people`s need for and fear of others; the desire for a state powerful enough to protect rights that they do not trample on, and for a law of contracts and property that realizes the intentions of the parties and guarantees their freedom of action, but also protects their (and the safety of others).
